). Physics in Mind begins by broadly considering classical arrows of time; the book then surveys in particular the transduction of information from DNA in 1 dimensionally coded sequences to protein folding in 3 dimensions, biologically unique free energy economies of computational memory reset by biochemical instantiations of "Maxwell's demon," flows of biophysical power through high-energy phosphates and energy-boosted electrons, and rapid information transmission relevant to neuronal signal propagation via incarnations of Maxwell's demon within cell membrane ion channels. Physics in Mind goes on to present in rigorous fashion established aspects of known mainstream biophysics for which quantum phenomena play an intrinsic though not specifically or uniquely intracerebral role: single photon capture by chlorophyll in photosynthesis and by "tuned" rhodopsin in visual receptors, as well as transformation of quantum processes into molecular information by "G-demons." Finally, Physics in Mind discusses possible candidates for quantum substrates of neurocognition specifically within the central nervous system along with arguments both for and against their scientific plausibility; here both thermal decoherence, familiar from the objections of Tegmark (2000) , and the intracellularly restricted location of microtubules are invoked by Loewenstein to argue against the orchestrated coherent tubulin wave function collapse proposed by Penrose and Hameroff (1996) , while a dielectric interneuronal membrane lipid substrate supporting coherent states needed for intramolecularly programmable quantum computation is suggested by Loewenstein as a possible alternative to tubulin.
All the above aspects of Physics in Mind are potentially valuable gifts to the future of cognitive neuroscience. However, the virtues of those gifts also imply a significant caveat about their value. This proviso is related to Loewenstein's disciplined limitations on the scope of his own inquiry. He at least implicitly proposes to grapple in terms of neurophysics mainly with the forms of cognitive experience, i.e. with the "measurement of meaning" and with relative differences among qualia such as varieties of perceived color; nevertheless, he does not address the brute generic fact of subjective consciousness. Thus, in the end, while Loewenstein's book offers an important signpost of further possible progress in quantitative correlations between neurocomputational structures and qualitatively particular kinds of cognition, his work does little to address the nub of Chalmer's (1995) ever-refractory "Hard Problem." Perhaps philosophers rather than biophysicists are still needed in the ongoing struggle to bridge this "explanatory gap" (Levine 1993 ).
